12.2 Nothing in this Article shall be construed as modifying or affecting a Member`s rights or obligations under such bilateral, plurilateral or regional agreements or governing the exchange of customs information and data under such other agreements. According to the Tibetan government-in-exile, some members of the Tibetan cabinet (Kashag), for example Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa, never accepted the agreement. [14] But while Tibet`s National Assembly “recognized the mitigating circumstances in which delegates had to sign the agreement, asked the government to accept the agreement. The Kashag told Zhang Jingwu that he would radio approve the agreement. [15] The news of the signing of the 17-point agreement by Tibetan delegates came like a bomb in Dromo. The Dalai Lama was “captivated” by this because he had kept the seals of the state with him in Dromo to prevent Ngapo and the other delegates from doing so (The 14th Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile 1990; p. 69). Immediately, the Dalai Lama telegrammed and ordered Ngabo and his company to send copies of the agreement to Dromo and remain in Beijing until further notice. But they decided to come back, saying that if the Tibetan government wanted to resume talks, it would be better to send new negotiators (Marie & Buffetrille edited; Authentication of Tibet 2008; p. 67). Although Tibetan delegates signed the agreement, its legal ratification still depended on the Tibetan government because Tibetan negotiators had no authorized powers (Warren W. Smith, Jr. Tibetan Nation 1996; p.
301). The signing of the seventeen-point agreement was later challenged as invalid in the Tibetan community in exile, which accused Tibetan delegates of signing under duress and that the Chinese allegedly used false seals from the Tibetan government. The exiled community and its supporters continue to claim that Tibetan representatives have not been allowed to propose changes and that the Chinese government has not allowed Tibetan representatives to communicate with Lhasa. [10] 12.1 This Article shall not prevent a Member from entering into or maintaining a bilateral, plurilateral or regional agreement on the sharing or exchange of customs information and data, including in a secure and expeditious manner, para. B example automatically or before the arrival of the shipment. [8] Takla, a Chinese translator for Tibetan delegates, wrote in his memoirs that before signing the agreement, Tibetan delegates expressed a desire to inform the Tibetan government of its contents. But the Chinese authorities, circumventing international conventions, used delaying tactics and forced them to sign the agreement under pressure (Takla Phuntsok Tashi, Mi Tshe`i byung ba brJod pa Vol. II, LTWA; [Tibetan] 1995; pp. 67-68). This paper examines some of these dark aspects of the 17-point agreement.
For example, as soon as the Dalai Lama heard about the signing of the 17-point agreement in 1951, he had the best opportunity to denounce it directly and flee into exile, but he chose to coexist with the Chinese until 1959, only to escape under the cover of night and cancel the exile agreement. Many observers find these details paradoxical. In this article, the author discusses the intractable situation imposed on Tibet by the Chinese invading forces and the Dalai Lama`s assessment of the situation at the time. Ultimately, it makes sense to judge whether or not the Dalai Lama`s return to Lhasa served the desired purpose. In doing so, the author hopes to present a balanced understanding of the circumstances that led to the signing of the 17-point agreement and the resulting “demise of the Lamaist state.” 2. In implementing the Agreement, complaints by the Tibetan people about policies that are impracticable to them should be heard. The 17-point agreement included a long preamble, which was not discussed in advance during the negotiations. Just one or two days before the signing of the agreement, a draft preamble was handed over to the Tibetan delegates. This was the first time that Tibetan delegates had seen the preamble.[11] .